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Preface
This working paper was
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for a volume of essays on the proposal for

nationa'l economic planning being edited by Laurence Chickering.
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Science Associations In Dallas, Texas, on December 29, 1975 ..

THE CONTRAST BETWEEN GOVERNMENT PLANNING AND BUSINESS PLANNING:
MARKET ORIENTATION VERSUS CENTRALIZED CONTROL
by Murray L. Weidenbaum, Director
Center for the Study of American Business
'-lashington University, St. U>uis

The widespread use of planning techniques· in private business has led
many· observers to draw parallels to government planning. Senator

J~cGb

K.

Ja~ts,

the co-sponsor of the proposed Balanced Growth and Economic Planning Act of

1975 (the Humphrey-Javits National Planning Bill) has stated, in support of
his bill, "if corporations are to take a look at where their companies are

1/

heading, it seems appropriate for the government to do the same."-

In the same article, Senator Javits refers to a school of thought which
finds planning "perfectly acceptable" for corporations but unacceptable for
government. Those of us who actually have been involved in planning for both
the public and the private sectors may also be aware of the important differences
as well as the similarities between public and private planning. As a former
planner in the aerospace industry, voluntarily retired, I cannot help but note
that for a number of years the industry-looked up to Lockheed for the most structured, sophisticated, and widely emulated long range planning in the defense
industry. Is bu$iness planning more a case of the closer you get, the worse it
looks?
Clearly some examination of the development and workings of the planning
process in the private sector should be of some use in the current debate over
the desirability of setting up a formal long-range planning mechanism for the
Federal Government.
Development of Long Range Business Planning
Long range planning in American business is primarily a post-World War II

?}
phenomenon.
Note:

It has undergone two distinct phases, although

ma~y

corporations

The author gratefully acknowledges the contribution of Linda Rockwood
to the research for this paper.
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still have not made the full transition to the second phase. The first phase
was essentially an extension of long-range budgeting and sales forecasting.
Past and present performance was simplY extrapolated into the future on the
b~sis

of rather rudimentary techniques. The implicit but

tion was essentially passive -- that business would
market forces rather than attempt

~

under~ing

primari~

assump-

respond to current

influence future developments.

The second phase is more activist in outlook. It seeks to

identi~

the

major issues and options which will face the corporation in the future and to

~

indicate possible new courses of action.

It is often predicated on the belief

that the pace of technological and environmental change is more rapid now than
it was in the past and that the new trend will continue into the foreseeable
future.
With the widespread establishment of corporate planning staffs in most of
the large corporations and in many .medium size companies, a business planning
fraternity has developed. A variety of professional associations and journals
has been established. The Budget Executives Institute was renamed the Planning
Executives Institute. And, inevitably, business planners frequently meet to
exchange experiences, if not to provide mutual moral support.
\>lith the rapid growth of planning staffs, planning doctnnents, and planning
personnel, what has been the impact on the companies themselves? How successful
have the planning efforts turned out in practice? Frank~, there are few objective
measurements of this essentially subjective activity. We do have the evaluations
provided by observers of the process.
David Ewing reports in his classic study of long-range business planning,
"The paradox is that the planning movement, despite such strong motives to make
it

su~ceed,

has not generallY been blessed with success. The tritnnps have been

-3stunning -- but few.

,!!J

Planning consultant Malcolm ' 1. Pennington rates 99 percent of all
1

corporate plans as failures because planning (a) has changed the way companies
operate in only a very few cases and (b) has rarely satisfied the needs and
desires of top management. "Certainly no other function has survived so much
futile work, or such frequency of failure."2f
Patrick

H. Irwin reports that, to his knowledge, fewer than one company

in twenty has .succeeded in instituting a well-developed system of long-range
strategic and operational planning.§(
E. Kirby 1-l?rren, in a major study of business planning, concluded that few
executives were satisfied with their company's ability to translate long-range
planning int? meaningful practice. It is intriguing to consider Warren's
observation that each company management took solace in the fact that, while
their company was not doing a very good job in this area, neither was any of
its competitors. "Frankly, this was quite accurate in 1958, and, unfortunately,
there are relatively few exceptions today." according to Harren.7/
In his summary of the

state-of-th~-art

of business planning, Robert J.

Mockler presents the following evaluation: "In spite of the advances made
during the 1960's, relatively few companies have developed effective planning
operations

although many have tried.

,/2/

These essentially negative. evaluations tend to be in accord with the
detailed survey a decade ago of planning in the government-oriented defense
industry in vrhich the author participated:
" ••• inquiries were made into the role that formal planning plays
in the corporate strategy decisions that determine the future posture
of the firm. The responses suggest the limited role that planning does
play in corporate decision-making. Corporate executives tend to rely
more on their intuitive judgment as to the significance of current trends

-4and future activities ••• The executives frequently stated
that their decisions are not made from within a detailed
planned structure. As one officer put it, they must rely
on 'taking advantage of opportunities rather than having
a deep plot' to achieve successful results in their business."
Even an enthusiastic exponent of business planning such as George
Steiner acknowledges the shortcomings that occur:
"In the development of profitable and healthy organizations
there is no substitute for long-range planning. For many it
has afforded the margin needed to achieve outstanding growth
and profitability. Too few companies, hQ~~ver, actually
achieve effective long-range planning."]£/
Some of the reasons for the shortcomings in the practice of business
planning may be limited to the private sector. Others may be more

uniYers~l,

and their correction in the public sector even more difficult. Mockler, for
example, points out that the business planner
''works in a vacuum, acting as a sounding board for corporate
management's futuristic thinking but iso~it~d from the
operating realities of the organization. ~
Consider how much more serious the consequence would be of the government planner working in a vacuum isolated from reality. He nevertheless would
be involved in what could be critical decisions affecting the future of individual private sector organizations and individuals.
Irwin lists as one of the four reasons for the lack of success of business
planning, the failure to provide a system that integrates the goals of the
12
company with those of individual managers. / The problems of _integrating the
goals of 200 million citizens, including tens of thousands of private sector
managers and decision-makers, are surely staggering.
Despite the various shortcomings, many American buaness firms do continue
to engage in formal long range planning efforts and apparently believe that the
benefits exceed the costs. A variety of reasons is given, not all of which may

-5be applicable to or desirable in the public sector. Many company managements
state that planning is a powerful instrument for tightening organizational
discipline and control of the business. Others contend that planning can be
used to lend authenticity and plausibility to the corporate leader. In this
latter view, a chief executive officer of a corporation with a formal

pl~,

neatly printed and indexed and properly illustrated, preferably with detailed
statistical appendices, provides the image of having the management task well
in hand. His counterpart who still relies on intuition and the proverbial
back of the envelope may be at a psychological disadvantage.
According to David Ewing, one of the most important and recurring motives
for planning has been the desire for controlling what people do.

w In· .the

words of the manager of planning of Stauffer Chemical, "The only time the
planning department is doing a useful purpose is when it is doing something
that the chief executive wants done •••• The planner is at his most powerful
when he has the unequivocal support of a strong chief

executive."~

Many individual business planners and planning organizations survive
and prosper because of the importance of the ancillary functions

they may

perform. These range from diversification studies and merger negotiations to
economic forecasting and market research to providing a corporate focal point
for social responsibility concerns and governmental relations. Moreover, the
chief planner may essentially serve as an internal management advisor. He or she
may be a useful individual to be included in corporate management groups,
particularly where the other participants are committed to representing specifie company divisions or large functional areas.
Business Versus Government Planning
Even if the shortcomings of the state-of-the-art of business planning are
not as universal as indicated above and can be reduced or eliminated with
additional time and effort, there are important differences between business

-6and government planning. These differences should influence our views toward
the desirability of adopting a stronger and more influential national planning
system. Boiled down to fundamentals, we are dealing with the difference between
forecasting and reacting to the future and trying to regulate it. Corporate
p·lanning of necessity is based on the principle of trade -- attempting to persuade the rest of society that they ought to purchase the goods and services
produced by a given
nally oriented. In

fi~;

the controls that may accompany the plan are inter-

strikin~

contrast, the government is sovereign and its

planning ultimately involves coercion, the use of its sovereign powers to
achieve the results that it desires. Its controls are thus externally oriented,
extending their.sway over the entire society.
At the outset, the proponents of a formal national economic planning
system say that they would not set specific goals for General Motors, General
Electric, General Foods, or any other individual firm. But what would they do
if these companies would not conduct themselves in the aggregate in accordance
with the national plan? Would they leave the actual results to chance or to
the free market?

Hardly. They state that the planning office 'vould try to

induce the relevant industries to act accordingly. nl5/
And the inducements of course are not trivial. The totality of the
government's powers to tax, to purchase, to subsidize, to "assist" and to
regulate are awesome. The most powerful and sophistic.a ted planning system in
the private sector lacks the ability to levy taxes and to funnel the revenues
from those taxes· away from one potential sector of the society and to another.
Although much of the rhetoric favoring a national economic planning
system is in terms of merely developing and providing better information, improved fact

gathe~ing

appears to be a means to another end. Daniel Patrick

Moynihan referred, in a somewhat different connection, to that increment to
central control that seems to accompany enlarged information gathering.

l§/

-7Even a cursory examination of the literature on American business
planning demonstrates that planning is intended to be far more than improved
information accumulation and analysis.

Malcolm Sherwood offers one of the

more comprehensive statements in this regard, based on work of the American
Management Association:
"Planning is an analytical. process which encompasses an assessment of the future, the determination of desired objectives
in the context of that future, the development of alternative
courses of action to achieve such objectives, and the selection
of a course or courses of action from among these alternatives."!1./
Robert G. Murdick offers a variation on that theme, "A plan is a predetermined course of action over a specified period of time which represents
a projected response to an anticipated environment in order to accomplish a
specific set of adaptive objectives."'JlY

Ewing offers what is perhaps the

most terse rendition, "Planning is to a large extent the job of making things
happen that would_not otherwise occur."l9/
The proponents of centralized government planning do not leave the matter
in any doubt.

They clearly state, "The heart of planning is to go from infonna-

tion to action." 20 /

They go on to point out, "In order to be effective and

useful, an Office of National Economic Planning must be set up at the cepter of
our most influential institutions •••

The Director of the Office of National

Economic Planning should be designated as the chief adviser to the President for
economic affairs."?Ji
The essence of the difference between public and private planning is the
locus of decision-making.

If Ford or General Motors or Chrysler are not selling

as many automobiles as they had planned, there are a limited number of things
they can do about the matter.

They can -- within their available resources --

lovrer the price or change the nature of the product.

But -- as evidenced by the

-8demise of the Etlsel, the LaSalle, and the DeSoto -- they may at times
be forced to abandon the project.

simp~

The consumer remains the ultimate decision-

maker.
The situation is quite different in the public sector.

Compared to the

largest private corporation, there are more options available to the government.

If the government does not think that the American public is buying

enough cars it can lower the price to the consumer as much as it likes via
tax reductions, down to

z~ro

if it so determines.

Alternatively, the

gove~ment

can subsidize the private manufacture of automobiles or it may purchase outright
the output of the automobile industry or
control of the industry.

simp~

take over the ownership and

The government certainly has demonstrated the willing-

ness to involve itself in the production of motor vehicles to the extent of
deciding by fiat many aspects of their design and operation, under its safety
and environmental powers.
Senator Hubert Humphrey has made the same point much more

vivid~:

"vlhat can government do about it? Government can do a lot
about it. For example, the size of automobiles, and consequently energy consumption, can be influenced a great deal
by taxing cubic displacement, horsepower, or weight. A tax
will slow down purchasers of large cars and give a premium
to small-car buyers and buyers of cars with high fuel efficiency. Government can also influence industry by giving an
investment tax credit to companies that produce fuel-efficient
automobiles. These are just two ways in wh~ch government
policy can influence the private economy."
The Senator also reminds us that the government is a large purchaser of
goods and services:
"Everybody else fades into insignificance in comparison. From
the viewpoint of purchasing power, General Motor~_~s a peanut
stand compared to the United States Government."~

Mr. T. A. Murphy, Chairman of the Board of General Motors, has provided
a clear distinction between business and national planning:
"If all we were talking about were government plans that are
comparable to business plans, there would indeed be nothing

-9to debate. Government units, of course, should try to anticipate future demands on their resources and plan to meet
them, just like any private business. We wish them well at
it and would like to see them do an even better job. But
that isn't the issue.
"Unlike a business, a government may not only plan -- it
may also command. A business can set goals only for itself~?/
a government body can set goals for other people as well."~
The point being made here is not that private planning does not involve
control, but that those subject to its control powers are quite different.
Once a private corporation adopts its long-range plan, it may push hard on
the various units of the corporation to meet their goals and objectives. But
the controls are essentially internal -- incentives and sanctions focusing
exclusively on the officers and employees of the corporation; if things go
wrong, the onus falls on the officers, employees, and shareholders. Government
planning, in contrast, focuses on "guiding" or "influencing" -- and thus
ultimately controlling -- the activities of the entire nation. If things go
wrong in public sector planning, it will be the taxpayer and consumer who
bear the main burden. Note the close connection between selecting planning
objectives and the programs to carry them out in the statement of the proponents
of centralized planning: "It goes without saying that the final choice among
all feasible alternative planning objectives and programs belongs to Congress •••• rrg}Jj
Consider carefully

the comment of Senator Hubert Humphrey, the co-sponsor

of the Balanced ·Growth and Economic Planning Act of 1975, "I don't think we
ought to compel, but we surely can influence."'?2/ As Hebert Stein has noted, if
the government can make a private citizen an offer he cannot refuse, it can
.
exerc1se
coerc i

26'
on.~

In a sense, there may be two types of government planning that need to be
distinguished. The external planning -- which has been discussed. here

involves

all sorts of extensions of government powers over the private sectors of the

-10-

economy. A second type of government planning is more internally-oriented,
and may be more comparable to private sector planning. This second type of
planning really relates to the management of government's own activities.
The advocates of more powerful government planning tend to merge the two,
using shortcomings in government's management of its affairs as a reason for
extending government power and influence over consumers and business.
In his far-ranging statement advocating national economic planning, Senator

Humphrey deals in passing with this second aspect of government planning:
don't have any economic impact statement for governmental decisions. The government goes around willy-nilly
making decisions of consequence. There was no estimate of
the economic impact of the Occupational Safety Act, for
example. I happen to be for the occupational safety program, but what were its economic implications? Did anyone
think that through? No.

" ••• we

" ••• the manner in which we are presently utilizing government resources and government agencies is a haphazard,
helter-skelter enterprise ••• we can show that with some
planning in our government, just a modest amount, a little
more than we're doing, we can reduce g~y~rnmental costs
and get better governmental services. rtg:u
It would appear, however, that a

gov~rnment

a haphazard, helter-skelter basis would be

which is being conducted on such
rel~ctant

to take on the extremely

ambitious task of managing the entire economy prior to getting its own house
in order. Moreover, attempts in the recent past to apply business planning
techniques to the management of the government's own affairs do not inspire
confidence.

Certain~,

they do not form a satisfactory basis for an expansion

of government planning efforts along the lines of the Humphrey-Javits bill.
The Planning-Programming-Budgeting System and Other Planning Experiments
There is little need to guess at the impact of a government-wide planning
system at the Federal level. We need only examine the planning system that was

-11instituted by President Lyndon B. Johnson. On August 25, 1965, he announced
with great fanfare the introduction of "a very new and very revolutionary
system of planning and programming and budgeting throughout the vast federal
government, so that through the tools of modern management the full promise
of a finer life can be brought to every American at the lowest possible cost."g§,/
President Johnson went on to describe his view of what was given

~acronym

PPBS in some detail:
"Under this new system each Cabinet and agency head will
set up a very special staff of experts who, using the
most modern methods of program analysis, will define the
goals of their department for the coming year. And once
these goals are established this system will permit us to
find the most effective and the least costly alternative
to achieving American goals •••• So this new system will
identify our national goals with precision ••••• "?:2./
PPBS

initial~y

was greeted with great enthusiasm. For a while it created

a land-office business for the services of economists, statisticians, and program
analysts.

Professors

Bertr~

Gross and Michael Spring enthusiastically described

PPBS as "potentially the most significant management improvement in the history
of American government ••• "~

The August 1965 annotmcement did have a substan-

tial history behind it. Since January 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara and Assistant Secretary

s.

Charles J. Hitch had been attempting to apply

the principles of program budgeting to Pentagon decision-making. And a substantial portion of the McNamara-Ritch reforms have endured in the Pentagon, notably
the 5-year projections of force structures and budgets, as well as the review of
budget submissions along program rather than merely service lines.
Some of the enthusiastic overreactions in the implementation of PPBS perhaps
were inevitable and not fundamentally different from private sector experiences.
When one divisional manager of a large electronics company was asked to state his
division's basic goals as an input to the corporate planning process, he listed

-12-

4oo different "basic goals." Another division manager's plan consisted entirely of 100 pages of statistics, with not a single word except for column headings.
Also, it takes many years, not the mere months in President Johnson's timetable,
to establish a planning system. As pointed out by Harold Henry, formal planning
systems do not materialize in "a period of a few weeks." Such a system is
1
d eveloped gradually over rr a period years. u31
~ R. Hal Mason estimated a

6o -108

month time sequence for the establishment of a full-fledged planning organiza.
32/
t 1.on.-

In retrospect, it is quite clear that PPBS -- at either the Pentagon or

White House levels -- did not help the Federal Government avoid fundamental
overcommitm.ents either at home or abroad or to avoid an unusual array of "crises."
Those who blithely assume that the "successes" of business planning can readily
be replicated at the national level may well ponder over both the failure of the
Edsel in the private sector and the nature of the major federal decisions which
were made at the peak of the PPBS enthusiasm -- a deeper American involvement
in the Vietnam War and the overpromising of the Great Society domestic programs.
The point being made here is not that the attempt to introduce organized
planning led to these failures but rather that it clearly did not prevent them.
David Ewing offers a stronger conclusion, "For sheer magnitude of fiasco, however,
business cannot compete with planners in the military and government." 33 /
Since 1969, the PBBS apparatus has largely been dismantled in the Federal
Government. What remains is performed in a more modest manner and as part of
the annual budget preparation. One of the more sympathetic but balanced appraisals
of the PPBS effort was prepared by Jack W. Carlson, a professional economist
who was involved in the program in a major way at the Office of Management and
Budget:
"The U.

s.

experience was clearly short of the ideal.

-13Initially, PPBS became a different, somewhat competitive
channel for decision-making ••. the intent was to provide
more useful information for the development both of budgets
and legislation, but that was not the initial result •
••• The government, not to mention the private sector, already
turns out thousands of analyses, eva~uations, and studies
~
41
every year. Their influence on policy is usually negligible."b
In_view of the impact of a more formidable planning system, such as that
utilized in Great Britatn, perhaps we should be pleased that the results of
PPBS were mainly paper shuffling; wheel-spinning exercises. In his analysis
of Britain's experiences with centralized planning, John Jewkes painted a
rather dismal picture:
"I believe that the recent melancholy decline of Great
Britain is l~rgely of our own making ••• At the root of
our trcUlbles lies the fallacy that the best way of
ordering economic affairs is to place the responsibil~~~
for all crucial decisions in the hands of the State."Th

In his analysis of the French planning experience, John Sheahan cites
a different type of problem, the possibility of large private corporationscoming
to dominate the government planning process. This would be an extension of the
widely held "capture" theory of federal regulatory agencies, whereby the industries being regulated may come to dominate the decisions of the government
agencies set up to ·regulate them. Sheahan contends that planning by consultation
and negotiation in France tends to drive the government planners into such close
alliance with business interests that the planning board becomes a champion of
the firms which it finds it easiest to deal with. Since these are usually the
la.rgest businesses, government pl,anning thus has weakened competition and may
have resulted in neglecting social concerns.1§!
Uhder none of these alternatives does a comprehensive scheme of national
economic planning appear to improve the overall performance of the national
economy.If anything, it would tend to shift even further the focus of private
enterprise away from dealing with market forces and meeting consumer demands

-14and toward reaching an accomodation with an ever more powerful governmental
bureaucracy.

A company might find it desirable to shift resources from

conventional marketing activities toward convincing the government to adopt

•

more generous production targets for its industry. Thus, the payoff from
traditional consumer market research might be less than from new efforts to
persuade the government to treat the

i~dustry

more generously.

We could readily conjur up visions of civilian companies following some
of the practices of that branch of American industry, defense production,
which is now most closely tied to governmental decision-making.

Business-

financed hunting lodges and fishing trips for civilian government planners
might seem to merely follow an older defense industry tradition.

But,

legal or not, such public sector "marketing" activities would seem to be a
low priority usage of business resources.

Yet, given the incentive of any

organization to grow and prosper in the environment it faces, this result
would not be surprising under a system of strong national economic planning
and decision-making.
Conclusion
The advocates of national economic planning who base their case on an
extension of business planning activities overestimate the state-of-the-art
in the private sector. In a study of thirteen large, technically oriented
manufacturing companies, the author and his colleagues reported that most of
the output of long range planning groups was found to be more in the nature of
scheduling current programs with long leadtimes, rather than in the develop-

37

I

ment of tne long-range business plans.~

The study concluded that typical long-range plans contained excessive
amounts of trivia, such as monthly delivery schedules, the recruiting budget,
square footage of storage space by type, and so forth. "This may - in a small

-15way - help to explain why business plans are so infrequently used as
real decision-making tools."3B/
The rapid turnover of planning staffs and business planners is striking
testimony to the basic dissatisfaction with the results. On the basis of many
years of attending meetings with business planners, the author developed the
following rule of thumb: anytime you hear a business planner explain how
planning is done in his or her company, remember that the odds are better than
one out of two that in two years that planning staff will no longer exist,
that person will no longer head the planning operation, or both.
It is apparent that no amount of formalized planning has eliminated any
company's

uncertainty concerning future technological change, the vagaries

of weather, discoveries of energy or other natural resources, outbreaks of
war, assassinations of national leaders, or even shifts in the desires of the
fickle consumer. As Gerald Sirkin has stated, "Planners have no crystal ball"
or as James Matheson, Director of the Decision Analysis Group of the Stanford
Research Institute put the matter, "In this age you can't plan on your plans.

"Y2/

Yet, of course, business planning continues, and for a variety of reasons,
including the sheer momentum of past activity as well as the useful by-products
of the information provided to the management. There is an important "opportunity cost" involved that should be recognized. The manpower and other resources
that are devoted to the planning effort are unavailable for other purposes.
Both the high cost and the often modest results have led many companies
to scale back the originally overly ambitious planning efforts on which they
had embarked. In good measure this may have been the natural pattern of reaction
and accomodation to the overselling of a new management activity, but one
avowedly with more durability than the short-term fad. Yet, at least in the

-16case of one major corporation (General Motors), apparentlY the word planning
no longer is used in any corporate title or to describe any corporate activity. ~
As pointed out earlier, the possibilities for building on business planning
•

experiences to mold a national planning system are not attractive. Even discounting the very serious shortcomings of existing business planning techniques, the
differences between business and government decision-making are fundamental.
Despite all of the sophisticated apparatus, business planning is based on
the traditionally implicit -- and increasingly explicit -- assumption that the
ultimate decisions on the allocation of resources in the society are to be made
by individual consQmers. An important corollary of that is if a company guesses
wrong on what consumers buy it will suffer the consequences.
Government planning, implicitly or explicitly, is based on a fundamentally
different set of assumptionso Government determines what it considers to be in
the society's overall interests. If the public does not respond accordingly, it
is not the planners who are considered to be at fault. Rather, new and more
effective devices must be developed to get the public to accomodate to the
planners' view of the good (or great) society.
Boiled down to its essence, business planning is part of a decentralized
decision-making process where the individual consumer makes the ultimate choices.
National planning is a centralized process in which the key economic decisions
are made in the form of governmental edicts. The greatest danger
a form

of adopting

of centralized economic planning is that it will, perhaps unintentionally

at first but inevitably as its initial results prove disappointing, propel the
society away from market freedoms and toward greater governmental controls over
individual behavior.
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